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Shading a Promise: Interpreting
the Livelihood Rights Clauses
in Nineteenth-Century Canadian
Treaties with First Nations
Arthur J. Ray

Introduction
The Robinson Treaties of 1850 and Treaties 3 to 9 contain variously worded
clauses that promised First Nations that they would be able to continue to earn
their livelihoods from the lands they surrendered, in the manners related to development. Subsequently, these clauses have been the subject of ongoing treaty rights
litigation. I will highlight the recurrent issues that I have had to address as an
expert witness over the past thirty years in cases concerning the Robinson Treaties
and Treaties 3, 6, 8, and 9. Some of these cases proceeded through trial and appeal
all the way to the Supreme Court; others never made it to court. Collectively, the
cases raise two major questions which I will consider in this document: What did
First Nations and government treaty negotiators intend these clauses to accomplish? Have government actions and litigation shaded the promises made long
ago?

Issues Arising from my Experience as an Expert
Witness
My involvement in Aboriginal and treaty rights litigation began in 1985 with the
Treaty 8 hunting rights case Regina v. Horseman (1990).1 It involved the Cree
hunter, Mr. Bert Horseman, who had killed a grizzly bear in self-defence, but
subsequently sold the skin in violation of the Alberta Wildlife Act (R.S.A. 1980),
which protected this endangered species. Mr. Horseman’s lawyer, Ken Starozyck,
phoned me in 1984 and explained that the case concerned interpretations of the
clause in Treaty 8 that guaranteed the First Nations who signed it that they and
their ancestors
shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as hereintofore described, subject to such regulations as may
from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority
of Her Majesty, and saving and accepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from
time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.2
— 59 —
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Mr. Starozyck pointed out to me that the clause raised a question about historical context: What were the usual vocations of the Cree in northern Alberta when
they signed the treaty in 1899 and 1900? In particular, did their “usual vocations”
include harvesting for commercial purposes? If the answer was yes, did this
activity include trading grizzly bear skins? Mr. Starozyck requested that I write
a report and give oral evidence that addressed these questions and that would
provide the court with the broader historical context it needed to interpret the
treaty properly. He thought that would require me to include a broad discussion
of the western Canadian fur trade during the nineteenth century. After expressing
some surprise that there was any question about whether Cree who were involved
in the fur trade of northern Alberta had fished, hunted, and trapped for commercial
purposes in 1899, I agreed to provide the evidence that Mr. Starozyck requested.
Data obtained from Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) archives made it abundantly
clear that the Treaty 8 area had been one of the company’s most important furtrading districts in the 1890s. I emphasized in my testimony that the commercial
and subsistence activities of Aboriginal people were inextricably interconnected.3
Furthermore, I presented data from the HBC accounts showing that grizzly bear
pelts had been traded at Fort Vermilion in the 1890s. This post was the one closest
to where Mr. Horseman had shot the bear. Alberta Provincial Court Justice Wong
accepted the evidence and ruled that Treaty 8 did promise commercial rights given
the usual practices of the Cree in 1899. Accordingly, she dismissed the charges
against Mr. Horseman.
The Alberta government appealed the decision to the Court of Queen’s Bench,
and rather than challenge the judge’s findings, the Crown contended that the
Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), as confirmed by the
Constitution Act (1930), had the effect of limiting Treaty 8 livelihood rights to
subsistence harvesting. Shifting the focus on appeal to the intention and effect
of the NRTA raised historical questions that had not been addressed in evidence
presented at trial. So, at the Court of Queen’s Bench, in support of the province’s
position, Justice J. Stratton conjured up legislative intent from the text of the
NRTA and turned to a dictionary for a narrow definition of the word “subsistence.”
Mr. Horseman then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where, acting in a
manner similar to Justice Stratton, a majority of the justices also concluded that
the drafters of the NRTA intended to limit treaty livelihood rights to subsistence
harvesting.
The court’s theory was that this curtailment was the quid pro quo for allowing
First Nations to pursue their harvesting rights throughout Alberta, rather than
only in their respective treaty regions (Treaties 7 and 8). As Frank Tough’s postHorseman research on the NRTA has shown conclusively, this textual rather than
contextual interpretive approach to the transfer agreements4 led the appeal courts
to invent a history and draw conclusions from it that are wrong. Tough noted
that the courts erred in two respects. First, their textual analyses of Paragraph 12
of the NRTA failed to take into consideration the fact that this section of the act
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mentioned “trapping” as one of the livelihood rights. Tough notes that the close
association of trapping with the commercial fur trade should have raised alarm
bells for the justices who argued that this section of the NRTA was meant to bar
commercial activities. Second, he points out that because none of the justices had
researched the drafting of the NRTA, which began in 1926, they were not aware
that the reference to trapping was added late in the drafting process in response
to interventions by the HBC, which had a vested interest in Aboriginal peoples
continuing their involvement in commercial harvesting.5
Soon after the Supreme Court of Canada’s Horseman ruling in 1990, I became
involved in a number of Treaty 9 (also known as the James Bay Treaty) rights
cases in Ontario, where the NRTA did not apply. The first of these was Regina v.
Spade, Regina v. Wassaykessic, which took place in a small provincial courtroom
in Thunder Bay, Ontario, in the autumn of 1992.6 The defendants, Ivan Spade
and Isaiah Wassaykesic, were from the Mishkeegogamang (New Osnaburg) First
Nation. Mr. Spade had been charged with unlawfully selling migratory birds
contrary to Section 5 of the Migratory Birds Convention Act7 and Mr. Wassaykessic with unlawfully selling sturgeon contrary to the Ontario Game and Fish Act
(R.S.O. 1990, Chapter G.1).8 The defendants’ lawyer, Mary Bird, wanted me to
educate the court about the commercial hunting and fishing activities that the First
Nations of the southern portions of the Treaty 9 region (south of the Albany River)
had been engaged in as participants in the fur trade prior to 1905.
Having been called in at the last moment when a previously contracted expert
withdrew, I did not have time to prepare a brief for the court. So, I presented
what was essentially one of the routine fur trade lectures that I gave every year
in my Native History course concerning the importance of “country provisions”
(food and commodities other than furs that were supplied by Aboriginal people)
to the operations of the HBC. These provisions included an array of fresh and
preserved foodstuffs. The trial judge was very receptive to my “lecture,” thanking
me afterward. He was a self-confessed “fur trade buff,” who indicated that he had
just read author and journalist Peter C. Newman’s account of the thousands of
geese that the Swampy Cree killed every year for the HBC’s posts on James Bay
during the eighteenth century.9 Not surprisingly, in the end the judge affirmed that
commercial harvesting was a usual vocation of Treaty 9 First Nations long before
1905.10
Immediately after Spade and Wassaykessic, I became involved in another
Treaty 9 fishing rights case. It arose in the autumn of 1992, when the Ontario
Crown laid a charge against Mr. Eli Moonias. At the time, the defendant was
the chief of the Marten Falls First Nation.11 He also operated a fishing company.
The Crown charged Chief Moonias with exceeding the quota of his commercial licence to fish for sturgeon on the Albany River. Chief Moonias wanted to
confront this charge for two reasons: he believed that his treaty rights exempted
him from having a quota imposed and, alternatively, he considered the quota to be
arbitrary because the Crown had not provided any biological data about the size
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or health of the Albany River sturgeon population. In other words, the Crown had
not proven the need for the conservation measure it had imposed.
Chief Moonias made his claim in the immediate aftermath of the landmark R. v.
Sparrow Aboriginal (1990) fishing rights case from British Columbia. In the latter
case, Mr. Ronald Sparrow of the Musqueam First Nation of British Columbia
had been charged with fishing for salmon with a drift net that was longer than
the band’s Indian food fishing licence permitted.12 The federal fisheries department had issued the licence with net size restrictions for conservation purposes.
Sparrow’s defence was that the regulation infringed on his Aboriginal rights
according to Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act (1982). In response to Mr.
Sparrow’s appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that legislation can curtail Aboriginal
rights if there is a valid objective and the restriction is consistent with the special
trust relationship created by history, treaties, and legislation, and the responsibility
of the government vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples. The court concluded in Sparrow
that conservation objectives do warrant placing restrictions on Aboriginal rights
provided that any infringement is limited to what is required to accomplish the
desired conservation results.13
With this ruling in mind, Chief Moonias’s lawyer, Mr. Francis Thatcher, asked
me to prepare a brief on behalf of his client, which focused on the Aboriginal
peoples’ consumption and exchange of fish and wildlife in northern Ontario
before the negotiation of Treaty 9 in 1905.14 He was particularly interested in
obtaining archival data about the size and nature of Native fisheries—especially
the sturgeon fishery of the Albany River. He anticipated that the HBC records
would show that commercial fishing had been a common activity of people from
Marten Falls First Nation and their neighbours. Mr. Thatcher also hoped that
archival data might provide some idea of what the long-term sustainability of an
Albany River sturgeon fishery might be.
I hired a team of research assistants to help me, and we examined all of the
records in the HBC archives pertaining to the company’s posts in the Treaty 9
region, which approximates the territory of the former southern department of the
HBC. We began with the earliest accounts from Fort Albany dating back to the
early eighteenth century. The data we collected made it clear that Native fisheries
became increasingly important to fur-trading operations as fur and game animal
populations declined because of overhunting and trapping. Aboriginal people
participated in local commercial fisheries in various ways. They supplied fish as
an article of commerce, they fished seasonally on contract, and some of them
fished as salaried seasonal or regular company employees. The relative importance of these various kinds of arrangements to the overall fish procurement of the
company varied considerably from post to post in the late nineteenth century.
Of particular relevance to Chief Moonias’s defence, the documentary records
indicated that in the late nineteenth century the Marten Falls Post relied heavily
on whitefish taken by seine fisheries15 operated mostly by Aboriginal men who
were retained on contract.16 The post managers often referred to them in general
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terms as “our fishers” or “the fishermen.” The fishers named most often from
1869 to 1899 included Old Betsy (and her daughter), Lame Man (and his sister),
Old Sturgeon, Moss Sturgeon, Sandy Sturgeon, Osshkapay (and his brother),
and Patrick and Jack Wich ee capay (and his sister).17 The post supplied these
and other Native contract fishers with salt, kegs, nets, and sometimes canoes and
tents. Fishers on contract usually received small advances and were paid for their
catches once they delivered them to the post. Sometimes the post manager hired
Aboriginal people to pack the fish in kegs for the fishers and haul them to the
post.18 Of the various seasonal fisheries, the autumn whitefish fishery was the
most crucial one for Marten Falls, as it was for most posts in the region.
Whereas most of the fish that native fishers caught on contract were salted,
those brought in by natives for trade mostly had been “hung” (dried and/or
lightly smoked), although some was fresh. Whitefish and suckers dominated the
trade judging from the journals, but sturgeon was also important.19 One of Chief
Moonias’s ancestors was mentioned in this trade. The Marten Falls journals show
that some of the Aboriginal men and women who fished on contract also sold fish
in the off-season. As noted, women also took part in the trade. The records from
other Hudson’s Bay Company posts on the Albany River are much less extensive
than those for Marten Falls, but suggest similar patterns nonetheless. Collectively,
the data from the HBC post records highlighted the importance of fishing for
commercial purposes throughout the Albany River drainage basin.
After my research team completed their work, I summarized the results in
a 271-page report that I submitted to Mr. Thatcher in June 1993.20 I never had
the opportunity of presenting it in court, however. This was because provincial
Crown attorneys withdrew the charges against Chief Moonias ten days before the
trial was scheduled to begin. The justification for doing so was that the lawyers
had concluded that there was insufficient scientific evidence to prove or to justify
the element of conservation beyond a reasonable doubt.21

Treaty Intentions
These experiences, and my subsequent involvement in Regina v. Powley (2003),
concerning Métis hunting rights in Ontario in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie, led
me to the conclusion that too much attention has been focused on commercial
versus subsistence harvesting. Likewise, litigation, especially in criminal cases
arising from violations of federal and provincial conservation legislation, is too
species-specific. These types of cases, as those I have been involved with illustrate, usually require that First Nations (and Métis) defendants prove that their
ancestors harvested a particular species of game, fur-bearers, waterfowl, or fish.
This brings us to two basic contextual questions. In the nineteenth century, was
it the practice of First Nations or government treaty negotiators to frame their
discussions in such specific terms? This raises a related and more basic question:
What were the purposes of the livelihood rights clauses?
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The Historical Context for the Original Livelihood Rights Clauses:
The Robinson Treaties, 1850
When reflecting on treaty-making in western Canada to 1880, Alexander Morris,
who had been involved in the process as lieutenant-governor of Manitoba (1872–
77) and of the Northwest Territories (1872–76), observed that the Numbered
Treaties
are all based upon the models of that made at the Stone Fort in 1871 and the one made
in 1873 at the northwest angle of Lake of the Woods with the Chippewa tribes, and these
again are based, in many material features, on those made by the Hon. W. B. Robinson
with the Chippewas dwelling on the shores of Lakes Huron and Superior in 1850.22

The Robinson Treaties were the first to include the livelihood rights clauses.
Specifically, these treaties stated:
The said William Benjamin Robinson of the first part, on behalf of Her Majesty and the
Government of this Province, hereby promises and agrees … to allow the said Chiefs and
their Tribes the full and free privilege to hunt over the Territory now ceded by them, and
to fish in the waters thereof, as they have heretofore been in the habit of doing; saving and
excepting such portions of the said Territory as may from time to time be sold or leased
to individuals or companies of individuals, and occupied by them with the consent of the
Provincial Government.23

This clause, the essence of which is repeated in later treaties with variable wording,
has two important aspects. The first addresses the First Nations goal of protecting
their right to continue traditional livelihood pursuits, which they could not do if
they were restricted to reserves. The second deals with Canada’s primary concern
of opening the territory for colonial development. In the case of the Robinson
Treaties, the primary objective was to facilitate mining. The clause accommodated the concerns of both parties, giving the Aboriginal people free access to all
areas not physically altered by colonial development projects. Very importantly,
the clause put no restrictions on hunting or fishing by Aboriginal people. Rather
it gave them “full and free privilege” to do so. To understand why the Robinson
Treaties granted such liberal livelihood rights, it is important to consider how the
local economic situation affected Robinson’s negotiating position. These local
circumstances predisposed him to make certain kinds of accommodations to
convince the Aboriginal people that it was in their interest to reach an agreement
with him.
I began research into the early nineteenth century Native economies of the
Robinson Treaties area in the late 1990s when Jean Teillet, who was legal council
for Métis hunters Steve and Rodney Powley of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, asked
me to prepare a report for her clients. They had been charged with hunting moose
without first obtaining a provincial hunting tag in violation of the Ontario Game
and Fish Act. They claimed they had an Aboriginal right to do so because it was
the usual custom of their ancestors to hunt before the Crown asserted effective
control over the Upper Great Lakes area. In my preparation for the case, I focused
on the nature of the Aboriginal economies (First Nations and Métis) in the Great
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Lakes area during the first half of the nineteenth century.24 This research revealed
that the Aboriginal people of Lake Huron and Lake Superior had very different
sets of economic priorities that they brought to the bargaining table. The southern
groups had more diversified economies and wanted to hold out for much higher
compensation than Robinson offered for relinquishing lands and the rights to
grant mining leases. The northern groups, in contrast, were much more dependent
on the fur trade. The problem for them was that the 1840s was a time when they
were suffering economic hardships because of fur and game depletion and low
fur prices. These northern groups believed that they could address their pressing
needs through a treaty by securing annuity incomes that would supplement what
they earned from traditional harvesting activities. Of particular importance, this
new source of income would enable them to buy the equipment and supplies that
were essential for fishing, hunting, and trapping without having to go heavily into
debt to fur traders. In other words, annuities could help them live off the land and
subsidize their participation in the fur trade.
When Robinson faced stiff bargaining from the southern groups, he decided to
take advantage of the fact that the northern and interior First Nations and Métis
had a different set of economic priorities. Therefore, he headed north to Lake
Superior where he was in a stronger negotiating position. Here the fur tradedependent groups quickly agreed to a treaty. This left their southern relatives with
little choice but to follow suit. They signed the Robinson Huron Treaty a month
later.25
Although Robinson did not keep a detailed record of his negotiations during
the summer of 1850, on September 24, 1850, he wrote a lengthy covering letter
(essentially a report) when transmitting copies of the treaties to the superintendent
general of Indian affairs, Colonel Bruce. In this letter, Robinson makes it clear how
he addressed the various economic concerns of the Aboriginal people. Regarding
the issue of valuing the land north of Lakes Huron and Superior relative to that in
the rest of Canada West, he wrote:
I explained to the chiefs in council the difference between the lands ceded heretofore in
this Province, and those then under consideration, they [the former] were of good quality
and sold readily at prices which enabled the government to be more liberal, they were
also occupied by the whites in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of the Indian
hunting over or having access to them.

Regarding the subject of hunting, he continued:
Whereas the lands now ceded are notoriously barren and sterile, and will in all probability never be settled except in a few localities by mining companies, whose establishments among the Indians, instead of being prejudicial, would prove of great benefit as
they would afford a market for any things they may have to sell, and bring provisions and
stores of all kinds among them at reasonable prices”26 (emphasis added).

In other words, Robinson’s own words indicated that he had pitched the treaties
with promises that the development would enhance rather than restrict Aboriginal
commercial hunting and fishing prospects by opening up additional local markets.
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It would also break the retailing monopoly of the HBC. Robinson advised Bruce
that guaranteeing Aboriginal people their traditional livelihoods would save the
government from the risk of having them make future claims on the treasury:
In allowing the Indians to retain reservations of land for their own use I was governed by
the fact that they in most cases asked for such tracts as they had theretofore been in the
habit of using for purposes of residence and cultivation, and by securing these to them
and the right of hunting and fishing over the ceded territory, they cannot say that the
government takes from their usual means of subsistence and therefore have no claims for
support, which they no doubt would have preferred, had this not been done.27 (emphasis
added)

Although Morris stated in 1880 that the Robinson Treaties, Treaties 1 and 2 of
1871,28 and Treaty 3 of 1873 served as models for those that followed (Treaties
4, 5, 6, and 7), curiously the texts of the 1871 agreements fail to include the
livelihood rights clauses of the earlier Robinson and later treaties. The omission
is even more puzzling considering that it was one of the “outside promises” that
were made verbally by government negotiators.29 According to written accounts
of the treaty talks, for example, in his opening address to the assembled chiefs,
lieutenant-governor of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, Adams Archibald
(1870–72), promised:
When you have made your treaty you will still be free to hunt over much of the land
included in the treaty. Much of it is rocky and unfit for cultivation, much of it that is
wooded is beyond places where the white man will require to go … for some time to
come.

He continued:
Till these lands are needed for use you will be free to hunt over them, and make all the
use of them which you have made in the past. But when the lands are needed to be tilled
or occupied, you must not go on them any more.30

Considering the time, Wemyss Simpson would have understood that making
“all the use” of the land would have involved commercial harvesting of fish
and wildlife. For instance, in a letter he wrote to the secretary of state for the
provinces in November 1871, Simpson commented on the treaties he had just
concluded. His reflections indicate awareness that the treaty would subsidize the
First Nations’ long-standing participation in the fur trade, which probably helped
make it appealing to them. For example, regarding the annuity provision of $3 per
person, Simpson said:
The sum of three dollars does not appear to be large enough to enable an Indian to provide
himself with many of his winter necessaries, but as he receives the same amount for his
wife, or wives, and for each of his children, then the aggregate sum is usually sufficient
to procure many comforts for his family which he would otherwise be compelled to deny
himself.31

His mention of “winter necessaries” no doubt was a reference to “winter outfits.”
The latter was the term fur traders commonly used when referring to the credit
they gave to their native clients in the autumn in the form of equipment that was
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needed for hunting, trapping, and fishing (ammunition, nets and/or net lines,
twine, traps, hatchets, knives, etc.) and a few so-called “luxury items” (mostly tea
and tobacco). By 1870, Aboriginal people of the central and the western interior
areas of Canada had been accustomed to receiving outfits for a period from a
century and a half to nearly two centuries. As I have noted elsewhere, in the 1870s
$16 or more per family would have paid for a significant portion of the goods
that constituted a typical winter outfit, albeit the First Nations of Treaties 1 and 2
subsequently thought it was not adequate.32
The livelihood rights clause that was omitted from the text of Treaties 1 and 2
reappears in Treaty 3, but a significant qualification was added. It stated that First
Nations harvesting pursuits would be “subject to such regulations as may from
time to time be made by the government.”33 The documentary record of the negotiations provides no insight about why the rights clause had been reintroduced with
this stipulation. On the contrary, the written records of the treaty talks suggest that
livelihood rights received little, if any, attention. The parties appear to have been
preoccupied with other issues. The most important of these were the demands by
the First Nations living in the southern portions of the future Treaty 3 area that
they be paid more for their lands than the government was prepared to offer. These
First Nations understood that their lands were located in a zone where the government wanted to build railway and telegraph lines, develop timber resources, and
anticipated that mining developments would take place there. Already steamboats
plied the boundary waters (Rainy River—Lake of the Woods), a wagon road (the
Dawson Road) had been constructed leading from the Rainy River northwest to
Red River, and towns were developing. This led the First Nations living in the
vicinity of the Canada-United States border also to demand compensation for the
wood already used for these developments and for use of the waterways. Because
they already were benefiting from the opportunities this new economic growth
brought, these First Nations could afford to hold out for better terms than Canada
initially offered.
Morris, who had replaced Archibald as lieutenant-governor of Manitoba and
the Northwest Territories, said of these hard bargainers: “The Rainy River Indians
were careless about the treaty, because they could get plenty of money for cutting
wood for the boats.”34 The result was that Morris and his fellow commissioners
spent most of their time trying to come to terms with these southern First Nations.
In the end, Morris had to raise annuity payments to five dollars as one way of
gaining an agreement from them.
The other strategy involved adopted the kind of “divide and conquer” strategy
that Robinson used in 1850. This involved appealing to groups who lived in areas
remote from the Rainy River-Lake of the Woods corridor. They had a different
economic agenda, which predisposed them to making a treaty. Morris said of them:
“The northern and eastern bands were anxious for one.”35 This was because these
First Nations’ greater dependency on the fur trade put them in a weak bargaining position. By the early 1870s, the world was heading into a major economic
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downturn and fur prices had started to decline, which would continue until 1885.36
The difficulty the northern and eastern First Nations faced was exacerbated by
increasingly frequent failures of the hunts. A treaty offered them the prospect of
addressing these urgent economic problems. A Lac Seul chief representing about
four hundred individuals made this clear to Morris. He said that his followers
wanted a treaty that would provide them with support for their traditional livelihood pursuits in the form of allowances of ammunition and twine as well as help
in developing agriculture. The chief noted that some of his people already planted
small plots of corn and potatoes to guard against the increasingly frequent food
shortages that resulted from poor hunts.37 Seeing an opportunity to break the ranks
of the assembled chiefs, Morris and his fellow treaty commissioners responded
to the overture of the Lac Seul chief by adding to the treaty package a $1,500
per annum allowance for ammunition, fishnet twine, seeds, and implements for
those who were doing some farming. So, once again, provisions in the treaty were
aimed at sustaining traditional livelihood practices, which included involvement
in all commercial aspects of the fur trade.

Conclusion
The preceding discussion has focused on the livelihood rights clauses of the
Robinson Treaties and Treaty 3, which Alexander Morris said served as models
for later agreements, and the verbal promises made in Treaties 1 and 2. In the
negotiations for all of these treaties, the Aboriginal peoples would have brought
perspectives to the treaty table that were based on a tradition of involvement in the
fur trade for a century and a half or more. For them, the commercial harvesting of
a wide range of fish and wildlife species had long been a usual vocation. As we
have seen, Robinson appealed to this fact in 1850 to win over those First Nations
in the Great Lakes who remained highly dependent on the fur trade. He did so as
a way of outmanoeuvring groups that had economic alternatives that put them in
stronger bargaining positions. Twenty-three years later, Morris, who was familiar
with Robinson’s tactic, faced similar negotiating problems and opportunities in
Treaty 3. Although Morris did not say he used the same sales pitch to woo the fur
trade-dependent groups, he did amend the treaty package to include provisions
that helped subsidize their continued participation in the fur trade.
None of the treaty talks I have discussed here indicate that any of the parties
involved thought about livelihood rights in the species-specific or commercialversus-subsistence terms that have become commonplace in rights litigation. The
latter perspective is one that derives from the post-conservation legislation era
and legal strategizing. As I have noted, in terms of the realities of Aboriginal
economic life and ecological circumstances, it makes no sense to think this way
because flexibility was the key to long-term economic survival. Aboriginal people
had to adjust their harvesting strategies to accommodate fish and wildlife cycles
as well as fluctuating markets.
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Although Morris added a qualifier to the livelihood rights clause in Treaty
3, which is replicated in the subsequent Numbered Treaties, I think it is highly
unlikely that he thought the phrase would have facilitated the subsequent placement
of substantial restrictions of First Nations livelihood rights. Evidence for this is
suggested in the concluding chapter of his monograph of 1880 that dealt with
treaty administration. Here he summarized the seven main features of the treaties
negotiated from 1850 to 1877. Regarding the livelihood rights dimension, Morris
said that in return for relinquishing “all the great region from Lake Superior to
the foot of the Rocky Mountains” the government granted: “permission to the
Indians to hunt over the ceded territory and to fish in the waters thereof, excepting
such portions of the territory as pass from the Crown into occupation of individuals or otherwise.”38 Strikingly, Morris did not mention that this right was subject
to government regulation. His comment on this dimension of the treaties does
highlight the key purpose of the livelihood clauses, however. Aboriginal people
were to be guaranteed the right to continue their usual vocations only on lands
not taken up by development. That was the key restriction. It was essential for
the achievement of the primary intention of the livelihood rights clauses. That
was to prevent conflict between settlers and Aboriginal people arising from noncompatible land usage. The clauses were neither intended to curtail commercial
harvesting of fish and wildlife resources by First Nations nor to serve as a means
by which settlers could appropriate those resources for commercial or recreation
purposes.
Nonetheless, subsequent treaty rights litigation and legislation before 1982,
when Aboriginal and treaty rights received constitutional protection, has had that
effect. This has meant that First Nations have had to wage a costly fight against
the narrowing of a broadly framed treaty right on a group-by-group, species-byspecies basis. Many are reluctant to sue for commercial harvesting rights in the
knowledge that they likely will fail, or at best will be granted only sharply limited
commercial rights. In these ways, the primary intent of the original promises has
been shaded and diminished.
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Endnotes
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3 I published substantial portions of this report in A. J. Ray, “Commentary on the Economic History
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english/elaws_rep_statutes_90g01_e.htm> Accessed February 9, 2009.
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12 The licence stipulated that drift nets were to be limited to twenty-five fathoms in length. Mr
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<http://Supreme Court of Canada.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs1-1075/1990rcs11075.html> Accessed June 13, 2008.
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14 See endnote 10.
15 Editor’s note: A seine is a fishing net that hangs vertically in the water held in place by attaching
weights along the bottom .
16 Often their wives and children were involved too. It should be noted that the “Sturgeon Clan” was
important in the area.
17 Marten Falls Journals 1869–99, HBCA B 123/a/85-93.
18 For example, the journal entry for October 18, 1872, noted: “Wich ee capay got his pay for his
assistance. 6 MB [made beaver] & his plug Tobacco & Falls potatoes each time he came in with
the full kegs … I promised him 1 MB per trip, but was to be 4 kegs each trip” B 123/a/88: 20.
19 It should be noted that in the 1890s, the journals make few specific references to the kinds of fish
the Aboriginal people bartered. Typically the entries simply say “Indians arrived with some fish,”
or “a little fish.”
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Report for the Marten Falls First Nation.” Unpublished, June 1993.
21 Facsimile from Francis Thatcher to Arthur J. Ray, June 2, 1994.
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24 Arthur J. Ray. “An Economic History of the Robinson Treaties Area before 1860.” Unpublished,
March 3, 1998. I cited some of this research in Ray, Miller, and Tough, 2000. 35–44.
25 Ray, Miller, and Tough, 35–44.
26 William B. Robinson to Superintendent General Colonel Bruce, September 24, 1850, in
Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories Including the Negotiations on Which They are Based, and Other Information Relating
Thereto. (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991 [1880]), 17–21.
27 Ibid., 19.
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28 Respectively also known as the Stone Fort Treaty, the Manitoba Post Treaty, and the North-West
Angle Treaty.
29 These two treaties were amended in 1875 to include the verbal, or “outside,” promises, but the
livelihood promise was not added. For a discussion of these amendments see Ray, Miller, and
Tough, 81–83.
30 Morris, 29.
31 Morris, 38, 43. It should also be noted that treaty negotiations were timed so that they did not
conflict with hunting, fishing, or trapping activities.
32 Ray, 1990, 32. The First Nations of Treaties 1 and 2 became upset two years later when their
relatives to the east received annuities of $5 in Treaty 3. To address their discontent, in 1875 the
government raised the annuities to bring them in line with Treaty 3.
33 Ibid., 220.
34 Morris, 65.
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36 Ray, 1990, 38.
37 Morris, op. cit.
38 Ibid., 285–86.
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